Gorbachev’s Thorn: Soviet Concessions and the Road to the INF Treaty

Deployed Warheads per Missile Systems as Listed by the INF Treaty with Ranges.

Map by author, May 2024. German Pershing-IA and French S3 missiles are also displayed.

Introduction

The United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 reignited concerns about destabilizing the nuclear and conventional balance in Europe.[1] The debate over nuclear de-escalation and arms-control during the late Cold War era has generated fresh interest, particularly in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War and worsening U.S.-China tensions.[2]

U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had deployed new missiles in Europe and invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet nuclear build-up that started in 1976 was now well underway, and hundreds of new missiles were pointed at European capitals. [3] Rising tensions showcased how détente and the Helsinki conference of 1975 had failed to stabilize the Cold War.[4] Instead, what replaced détente was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursuit of a dual-track decision in 1979 as a response to the USSR, and thus fears of a renewed arms race.

What became the final decade of the Cold War seemed at the time like a step backward, with nuclear tensions at their highest since the Cuban crisis.[5] In this context, which strategies did President Ronald Reagan use to reduce tensions? This paper examines the arms-control negotiations between Washington and Moscow prior to the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987, examining the steps from NATO’s dual-track decision, to Reagan’s own dual-track strategy, and finally to the 1986 Reykjavik Summit. The Reykjavik Summit marked the return of successful arms-control negotiations, when Soviet Secretary General Mikhail S. Gorbachev first agreed to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons and opened the door to the INF Treaty. [6] Finally, this paper analyses Reagan’s ‘zero-zero’ strategy, his subsequent global zero strategy, as well as the tools he used to compel Gorbachev to accept it. It additionally  provides cartographic analysis based on INF Treaty data of missile bases and stocks. Ultimately, this analysis aims to understand President Reagan’s commitment to the global zero strategy and argues that dual-track strategies, despite their criticism of brinkmanship, can facilitate de-escalation with authoritarian peer-competitors[7].

Two Dual-Tracks to Reykjavik

NATO’s Dual-Track Decision (1976-1979)

The dual-track approach, formalized by NATO in the 1979 Integrated Decision Document (IDD), took the form of simultaneous deployments of U.S. missiles to Europe along with an offer to Moscow to resume arms control talks.[8] Three years earlier, the Soviet Union’s deployment of nuclear-tipped RSD-10 Pioneer missiles triggered German Chancellor Schmidt’s concerns towards the NATO-USSR balance in non-strategic, Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF).[9]

The road-mobile RSD-10 was intended to replace aging siloed R-12 and R-14 missiles, but its technical characteristics shook the European nuclear balance.[10] The Pioneer’s ability to reach just below 5,500 kilometers meant it remained compliant with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), as a mere Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).[11] This nevertheless enabled the new Soviet missile to reach Western Europe from most of its deployment areas in the USSR. Its three Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) tripled the number of targets that each missile could prosecute, and solid rocket fuel boosters meant it could be launched with minimum warning. While launched from bases west of Moscow, the RSD-10 could reach European targets in 7 to 10 minutes.[12]

Soviet Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev and his two closest advisors had taken this decision with minimum deliberation and hoped to keep Europe ‘hostage.’[13] This was an unnecessary upgrade from the Cuba-era SS-4 and SS-5 nuclear missiles they replaced. In the context of arms control talks and détente, the deployment directly led to the further deterioration of East-West relations, pushed NATO to adopt the IDD, and eventually for President Jimmy Carter to approve the deployment of the additional Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) TNF missiles to Europe.[14]

Reagan’s Dual-Track Strategy (1980-1985)

Over the course of his presidency, Reagan laid out and applied his own dual-track approach. First, Reagan pursued a strong, sometimes belligerent, approach towards the Soviet Union, in sharp contrast with his predecessor whose stance was more in line with a view of long-term conflict-management in the context of détente. Reagan instead delivered a particularly seething speech against what he called the ‘Evil Empire’ in 1983.[15] Furthermore, despite his abolitionist views towards nuclear weapons, he understood their role as bargaining chips, and his administration developed concepts aimed at reestablishing a balance with the Soviet Union’s arsenal.[16] Those included the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), eventually, blocked by Congress.[17] But Reagan’s pledge with the most potential to destabilize the nuclear balance was also the one that matched his anti-nuclear philosophy, in March 1983, Reagan delivered a speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).[18] SDI was his way to achieve three objectives at once: shift the Cold War from an offensive arms race to a defensive arms race, reduce the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and push the Soviet Union to a technological race it could not afford.[19] The Initiative would develop a series of space-based sensors and systems to detect and neutralize ICBMs from and in space, while its technological feasibility appeared limited, it nevertheless worried the soviets.[20]

But with all the brinkmanship, Reagan’s  maintained lines of communications open and sent numerous letters to Brezhnev and to subsequent Soviet leaders–including one sent convalescing from his injuries after he was shot outside the Hilton hotel in Northwest Washington.[21] One of Reagan’s first such calls for dialogue he delivered at one of his earlier speeches in 1981, when he offered the Soviet Union to cancel the deployment of missiles to Europe in exchange for the Soviet Union to decommission its RSD-10 missiles. The so called ‘zero-zero’ offer.[22] By essentially making an offer the Soviets could not accept, Reagan was able to position himself as less hawkish than anticipated, particularly in a context of large anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe and rising division within the alliance as to the role of nuclear weapons.[23] His critics perceived Reagan’s zero-zero offer as either naïve, contrary to NATO’s dual-track declaration, or disingenuous.[24] In reality, both Germany and the Netherlands had opened the door for a so called zero-zero option during the conversations over the IDD, with support from other NATO countries.[25] And indeed, it was unrealistic as the Soviet old guard whose formative years had been the Second World War would never agree to such a reduction in their perceived security.[26] But the quick succession of funerals in the Kremlin, from Brezhnev in 1982, to Yuri V. Andropov in 1984 and Konstantin U. Chernenko in March 1985, led Mikhail S. Gorbachev to become General Secretary of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, 20 years junior to his predecessors, would reinvigorate Soviet Policy with a newfound confidence in its system and enact reforms[27] Reagan had found an interlocutor at last, and the two would rapidly set up a meeting in Versoix near Geneva in November 1985. This was the first since the Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna in June 1979, close to 7 years prior. In Versoix, both sides appeared open to an agreement, laying the scene for Soviet concessions at Reykjavik.

Reykjavik (1986)

In the fall of 1986, the world came as close as it would ever be to a nuclear-free world. President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, met after less than three weeks of preparation in Höfði house, a windblown cottage in Reykjavik, Iceland. Over a couple days, initially one-on-one, the men would continue on intense negotiation with only a small core of key advisors. Gorbachev was resolved to stop the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles to Europe, which he viewed as a 'gun pressed to [their] temple' and a catalyst for a 'new round of the arms race.'[28] U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz accompanied President Reagan at Reykjavik and shared his belief that brinkmanship in the form of the deployment of Pershing II missiles and GLCM to Europe had led the Soviets to the discussion table.[29] Shultz had furthermore advised the president that Reykjavik should only yield progress on negotiations but not an agreement per se.[30]

The focus of this section will be the evolution of Gorbachev’s stance on INF missiles at Reykjavik. Gorbachev headed to Reykjavik with the understanding that the deploment of RSD-10 missiles to Europe has been a strategic mistake, as such he conferred with his advisors and decided to push for a zero option in Europe, and 100 missiles in Asia.[31] This was surprisingly close to an unsanctioned proposal by former U.S. Chief INF negotiator Paul H. Nitze during ‘walk in the woods’, offering for each to reduce INF missiles to 75 each.[32] Expert talks between the USSR and the U.S. just before the meeting had exchanged offers regarding INF, with the Soviets pushing for 100 missiles each in Europe and global ceilings for both, to which the US countered 200 global ceiling with 100 in Europe.[33] Essentially the U.S. offer was for a 100 limit in both Europe and Asia as it concerned the Soviet Union. The zero-100 offer as discussed by the Politburo was not initially discussed by Gorbachev. In the first morning session in Höfði house he instead remarked that the USSR was ready to discuss the zero-zero option only for Europe, attempting to avoid mentioning Asia. Reagan replicates with an offer to either pursue a global-zero or discuss limits for Europe only, something Gorbachev couldn’t agree with as it would allow for significant Pershing II numbers still.[34] In the afternoon session, after talks of strategic arms reduction, Gorbachev returns to the INF issue and presses Reagan on his sudden dislike of the global zero. Reagan points out that Soviet missiles based in Asia would still be in range of Europe.[35] Gorbachev then returns to a key soviet concern regarding NATO nuclear weapons excluded from arms-talks namely the arsenals and France and the United Kingdom (U.K.). In 1986, the U.K. did not have Ground-launched nuclear weapons which the INF relates to, and France only had 18 S3 missiles, and it had withdrawn from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group in 1966.[36] Notably, Reagan replies that he ‘has seen map from which it follows that while they can’t hit England, they can hit France, West Germany […]’[37] The next day’s session with Reagan’s offer of 100-100 missile parity in Europe and 100 Soviet missiles in Asia with 100 U.S. missiles in America, this might allude to an idea Reagan had to reassure Japan and China, by deploying INF missiles to Alaska.[38] Gorbachev then returns to the question of French and British weapons, this time quickly brushed aside by Reagan, who points out those arsenals are defensive in nature. Gorbachev then makes a surprise overture, saying is ‘is ready to look for solution there’ with regard to Asian missiles.[39] This would be the concluding deliberation regarding the INF debate in Reykjavik. The summit had brushed with the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but instead had only yielded limited results for Gorbachev, whose objective of tying Strategic and INF issues seemed threatened. The removal of Pershing II was within grasp but without an agreement on SDI the two leaders had failed to conclude.

Conclusion

A month after Reykjavik, Reagan broke the SALT II (non-binding) limits, in line with his dual-track strategy, and thus pressing Gorbachev for time in reaching an agreement on upcoming strategic arms reduction talks. Gorbachev would eventually split INF from the rest of the negotiations to achieve his political objective of advancing arms limitations. Gorbachev real thorn wasn’t the Pershing II but his own RSD-10. Reagan’s steadfastness in his pursuit of a dual track strategy had reassured allies in Europe by applying the essence of the IDD, The military deployments to Europe and SDI had been key bargaining chips for Reagan, whereas the Soviet’s RSD-10 had fulfilled no useful role and had come at huge expenses. The Euromissiles crisis and INF Treaty are key to understanding the final decade of the cold war.

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[1] Todd Lopez, “U.S. Withdraws From Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 2, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/article/article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/.

[2] On Europe see Emmanuel Maître, “Towards a New Missile Crisis in Europe?,” FRS, June 2023, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/autres/2023/AP2-2023-Maitre.pdf; With regards to China see Daryl G. Kimball, “The US and China re-engage on arms control. What may come next,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 15, 2023. https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/the-us-and-china-re-engage-on-arms-control-what-may-come-next/, and Bates Gill, “Exploring post-INF arms control in the Asia-Pacific: China’s role in the challenges ahead,” IISS, June 29, 2021. https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2021/06/post-inf-arms-control-asia-pacific-china/.

[3] The first RSD-10 Pioneer regiment was activated on August 30, 1976 and by late 1981 there were more than 250 missiles deployed, see Pavel Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, (London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 226; and “Final Communiqué,” NATO, Official Texts, October 21, 1981, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23112.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[4] James G. Wilson. The Triumph Of Improvisation, Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, And The End Of The Cold War, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 39-40.

[5] Nate Jones and Lauren Harper, eds. The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part I, (GWU, May 16, 2013), Document 2.

[6] On Gorbachev’s first acquiescence to zero-zero see Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, eds. The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret Documents from U.S. and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, (GWU, October 13, 2006), Document 13, 14.

[7] On brinkmanship, Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Arms Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 342-344.

[8] William Burr, ed. Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, The Road to the Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War. (GWU, December 10, 2010), Document 12.

[9] On German concerns, see Michael Broer, et al, “The NATO Double-Track Decision, the INF Treaty, and the SNF Controversy - German-American Relations between Consensus and Conflict.” Chapter. In The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, edited by Detlef Junker, 148–54. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles, The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2022), 13-15, 47-48; and Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation, 51.

[10] Soviet designation Pioneer or NATO: SS-20 Saber; Soviet ‘secret’ designation: R-12 Dvina or NATO: SS-4 Sandal; Soviet ‘secret’ designation: R-14 Chusovaya or NATO: SS-5 Skean, RSD-10 is a designation only used in the SALT, INF, and START treaties, see Mark Wade, ed, “Russian Designations,” Encyclopedia Astronautica,  http://www.astronautix.com/r/russiandesignations.html; and Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 582.

[11] On SALT treaty compliance, see “Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (with protocol). Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972,” U.N.T.S. 944-I, no. 13445 (1972). https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20944/volume-944-I-13445-English.pdf, Specifically, the Agreed Statements available here: https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm#agreed, [A]. As described, the closest distance between the continental United States and the Soviet Union was approximately 5500 kilometers, anything below did not classify as an ICBM for which exact definitions were agreed upon in the INF treaty.

[12] On missile characteristics see Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 224-225; on 7 to 10 minutes flight time see William Inboden, The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink (New York: Dutton, 2022), 44.

[13] Jones, Harper, eds. The 1983 War Scare, Document 22.

[14] Colbourn, Euromissiles, 48-50; Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War, A Global History, (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 460-461.

[15] “Remarks of the President to the 41st Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, March 8, 1983” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smof/speechwriting-speechdrafts/box-077/40-534-5709750-077-013-2017.pdf.

[16] For Reagan views on nuclear weapons see Paul Lettow, Reagan and his Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005), 4-6, 62, 101-102.

[17] U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1983, H.R. 7355, 97th Cong., introduced in House December 2, 1982, https://www.congress.gov/bill/97th-congress/house-bill/7355.

[18] “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-defense-and-national-security.

[19] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 432; Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 112-113.

[20] “Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (George)

to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense

Weinberger, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane),” re:

“Discussions by Soviet Officials of the SDI and Other Arms Control Issues,” September 25,

1985, in FRUS, vol. 5, available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus198-88v05/d98.

[21] Ronald Reagan, An American Life, The Autobiography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 269.

[22] “Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-members-national-press-club-arms-reduction-and-nuclear-weapons.

[23] Colbourn, Euromissiles, 107, 122-123; Burr, ed, Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, Document 6A.

[24] For an adversarial view of Reagan’s policy, see Talbott, Deadly Gambits, in particular page 39 for how to zero-zero is ‘contrary’ to the IDD, and 62-64 for naiveté; and Colbourn, Euromissiles, 143.

[25] Burr, ed, Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, Document 10; On early zero-zero discussions and subsequent champions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group see Colbourn, Euromissiles, 140-141.

[26] Wilson. The Triumph Of Improvisation, 45.

[27] On Gorbachev see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, the Soviet Collapse 1970-2000, (Oxford UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 57.

[28] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 5.

[29] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 212-213.

[30] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 4.

[31] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 5, 8.

[32] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 210-211.

[33] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 7.

[34] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 10.

[35] For RSD-10 range from Asia, see figure 1; Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 12.

[36] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 12; On French and British nuclear forces in 1986 see figure 1 and John Prados, Joel S. Wit, and Michael J. Zagurek. “The Strategic Nuclear Forces of Britain and France.” Scientific American 255, no. 2 (1986): 33–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24976015.

[37] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 12.

[38] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 272, 479.

[39] Savranskaya, Blanton, eds, The Reykjavik File, Document 14.

[40] sic